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This paper studies a model of the Internet broadband market as a platform in
order to show how di⁄erent pricing schemes from the so-called "net neutrality " can
increase economic e¢ ciency by allowing more investment of access providers and
enhancing consumers surplus and social welfare. We show that departing from the
"net neutrality", where ￿ at rates are used, introducing termination fees can increase
incentives to invest for the ISP and enhance social surplus.
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11 Introduction
The debate over network neutrality has become a huge debate in Internet policy both
in US and European Union. The question is whether the tra¢ c management practices
of network providers should be control by regulators and how should be de￿ned rules
allowing a better economic e¢ ciency. In practice, network neutrality has been often in-
terpreted as a set of rules allowing non-discrimination both between contents providers
and end-users. For a long time and until networks could handle the tra¢ c generated by
uses, network neutrality has resulted in a free and open access to network for content
providers. The main idea was that externalities from diversity of available contents to
end-users on platforms justi￿ed an indirect mechanism of cross-subsidy through users￿
payments to access providers. Today the situation is di⁄erent since tra¢ cs had sharply
rose because of the increasing development of contents and thus, network investments by
operators are became a necessity to support tra¢ cs. The question that arises directly
from such an observation is twofold: How to give incentives to invest? How allocate
investments ￿nancing between stakeholders? Beyond these questions analyzing the ben-
e￿ts and pitfalls of non-discrimination/discrimination rules for network access is a key
component to evaluate the Internet policy.
Because of the diversity of practices and the complexity in the economic relations
between network providers, content providers and Internet intermediaries, it is not easy
to de￿ne what is exactly non-discrimination rules. However, one can consider that non-
discrimination occurs whenever a network provider gives a same access to network tra¢ cs
of the same characteristics. This does not imply that the network provider must treat
di⁄erent networks tra¢ cs from di⁄erent contents providers in the same manner (same tar-
i⁄s, same QoS...). So, the economic literature indicates that discrimination may improve
economic e¢ ciency whenever it does not lead to anti-competitive practices. The main
goal of our paper is to show how di⁄erent pricing schemes a⁄ect investment incentives of
network providers, social welfare and its distribution between the stakeholders (network
providers, contents providers and end-users). In particular, we focus in the following on
the relevant impacts of termination fees.
A large strand of literature has recently developed on network neutrality. Most of
papers were discussing legal issues of network neutrality and the expected consequences
of its abolition. Economic analysis in this ￿eld is less developed although some recent
2theoretical research has been made in the ￿eld of two-sided market models. However,
the analysis is not usually straightforward as network neutrality can be de￿ned in several
ways.
Economides and Tag (2007) model the Internet Broadband market as a two-sided
platform in which broadband consumers stand on one side and content providers on the
other side. Their results show that network neutrality regulation (that imposes zero fees
￿on the opposite side￿of the market) generally increases industry surplus compared to the
fully private optimum1 at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content
and applications providers. As platforms have incentives to attract more consumers to
generate revenue from charging content provider, without network neutrality regulation
they set a lower subscription fee, hence consumers￿surplus increases. This positive impact
is o⁄set by the negative e⁄ect on content provision and ￿nally, the welfare increases with
network neutrality. In contrast, Hermalin and Katz (2007) consider network neutrality
as a situation in which the broadband platform produces a single access quality (non
discriminatory access quality). They assume both traditional markets and two-sided
markets where platform providers o⁄er services making a connection between consumers
and Internet applicant providers. Network neutrality plays as a product-line restriction
and as a direct e⁄ect low valuation applicant providers get ruled out of the market. Their
results show that network neutrality regulation by product restriction may hinder both
consumers￿surplus and social welfare.
The e⁄ect of network neutrality regulation on investments incentives for network
providers is analyzed by Choi and Kim (2008). They de￿ne network neutrality as non-
discriminatory in the delivery of content through networks. The model developed is based
on the queuing theory developed in operational research to take clearly account of band-
width scarcity and the need for rationing as the main causes of the network neutrality
regulation debate. In this setting, they show that the network providers￿decision on the
discrimination across content depends on a potential trade-o⁄between access fee and the
revenue from the trade of the ￿rst priority. Concerning the network providers￿investment
incentives, their results show that the growth in capacity a⁄ects the sale price of the pri-
ority right under the discriminatory regime. They conclude that as the relative merit of
the ￿rst priority becomes relatively small for higher level capacity, under discrimination
1These authors de￿ne the fully private optimum as the overall pro￿t maximizing scheme for the
monopolistic platform.
3the network￿ s incentives to invest may be smaller than that under network neutrality
regulation where such rent extraction e⁄ects does not exist. Finally, the welfare e⁄ects of
network neutrality regulation is ambiguous and depends largely on how capacity expan-
sion a⁄ects the need to acquire the priority right and thus the ability to extract rent from
content providers. Close to Choi and Kim (2008), Cheng et al. (2009) develop a game
theoretic model to highlight gainers and losers of abolishing network neutrality and to
analyze the broadband providers￿incentives to expand capacity. They ￿nd that content
providers are left worse o⁄ when network neutrality is abolished and consumer surplus
either does not change or is higher in the short run. In the short run, social welfare
increases whether one content provider pays for preferential treatment but remains un-
changed whether both contents providers pay. Finally, they ￿nd that incentive to invest
in capacity for broadband provider is generally higher under the neutrality regulation
because the network owner incurs a lost from the content provider￿ s side without net
neutrality.
In this paper, we explicitly model the Internet broadband market as a platform con-
sisting of end-users on one side and contents providers on the other side. We do not aim
here to show how crossed externalities between both sides of the platform a⁄ects prices
and social welfare. This question has been developed by a large literature. Our goal is to
show how, in a simple model, di⁄erent pricing schemes from the so-called "net neutrality
" may increased economic e¢ ciency by allowing more investment of access providers and
enhancing consumers surplus and social welfare.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section sets up the model of network
markets. Section 3 analyses the e⁄ects of network neutrality regulation on competition and
social welfare and studies the impacts of introducing termination fees to reach end-users
for content providers. Section 4 provides a complete analysis of the impacts of termination
fees discrimination on investment incentives of network provider and stakeholders surplus.
Section 5 o⁄ers extensions around the basis model examining the impact of termination
fee discrimination on incentives to invest of the broadband provider, and how termination
fee may induce more tra¢ c management from content providers. Section 6 closes these
analyses with concluding remarks. Most of the proofs for lemmas and propositions are
relegated to the Appendix.
42 The model
We consider a model in which a monopolistic Internet service provider (ISP) sells broad-
band Internet access to consumers. Consumers can freely obtain the contents of two
Content providers (CPs) from broadband Internet access. In that setting, we study how
di⁄erent pricing schemes may impact consumers surplus, ￿rms￿pro￿ts (ISP and CPs) and
social welfare. This especially allows to analyze the ISP￿ s incentives to invest to upgrade
its network quality according to net neutrality is applied or not and how regulation may
be relaxed. For the sake of analysis, we will de￿ne in the following net neutrality as
non-discrimination in the delivery of contents. That is, the ISP provides access to con-
tent providers at a unique ￿xed fee, in order to make their content available across the
Internet, and o⁄ers access network to consumers at a non discriminatory ￿ at rate.
2.1 Content providers
We consider competition between two content providers di⁄erentiated ￿ la Hotelling. Both
content provider use the same technology and we normalize the marginal cost to 0. For
connecting to the ISP, the content provider i bears the ￿xed fee fi and pays a unit price si
for each users. We suppose that content provider i can exert an e⁄ort denoted ￿i in order
to attract users towards their own content, where ￿i > 0. Such e⁄ort ￿i can represent the
quality of content that CPi o⁄ers to end-users. This quality represents a quality index
that encompasses editorial design, web design and so on. In the following, we consider




i. Without loss of generality, we will
assume that !1 = 1 and !2 = ! ￿ 1. That is, the CP2 is assumed to be less e¢ cient
than CP1. Furthermore, a content provider gets revenues from (exogenous) advertising
related to its market￿ s share, we denote a, the unit receipt for advertising.
2.2 Internet service provider
The monopolistic ISP, I, sells a network access to end-users and provides access to content
providers. The ISP can invest ￿i to increase the quality of network access for content i.
This assumption take into account situations where the ISP can discriminate between
both content providers using the quality of access (i.e. access prioritization). An example
of this kind of investment is an upgrade in network access with ￿bre optic cables to
5increase the capacity to deliver voice and data tra¢ c. This in turn increases the end-
users￿utility when they get content from content providers, and hence increases their
willingness to pay for contents. We assume that the quality of network access a⁄ects
the quality of content in a multiplicative form. In particular, we consider that when the
ISP invests ￿i, the gross utility for an end-user consuming the content of quality ￿i is
￿i(1+￿i). Focusing on incentives to invest only, we normalize the cost of this investment
to zero, without loss of generality. We assume that the ISP charges an access fee pi from
connected end-users for content i. On the other side of the market, the ISP collects a ￿xed
fee fi for content provider i to allow access to its network and a unit price si for each user
connected who consumes content i. This unit price corresponds here to a termination fees
charged to content provider i to reach end-users. The ISP bears a ￿xed cost normalized
to 0 to connect the two sides of the market, and a same marginal cost c for each unit of
tra¢ c coming from users and content providers. Under a network neutral regime, the ISP
cannot price discriminate users, hence the access fee does not depends on which content
is consumed, p1 = p2 = p. The same applies for content providers and we assume that
they can get access to the network at a non discriminatory ￿xed fee, f1 = f2 = f, without
paying a termination fee for each consumer connected, si = 0.
2.3 Consumers
Consumers are uniformly located on the segment [0;1]. The two content providers are
located at the two extremities of the segment, namely at x1 = 0 and x2 = 1 (respectively
for CP1 and CP2). We assume that consumers single-home, that is each consumer buys
Internet access from the ISP and consume one content only. Given the transportation
unit cost t and the quality of network access ￿i > 0, the utility for a consumer located at
x 2 [0;1] subscribing to the ISP is ￿1(1 + ￿1) ￿ p1 ￿ tx if he gets content from CP1, and
￿2(1+￿2)￿p2 ￿t(1￿x) if he gets contents from CP2. We consider here that the quality
of network access a⁄ects positively end-user￿ s utility whether he gets contents from CP1
or CP2. That is, there may be asymmetry between content providers based on network￿ s
quality.
Let ’ denote the di⁄erence in the quality of network access for content providers, that
is, ’ = ￿1 ￿ ￿2.
We can interpret , ’ as the degree of non price discrimination between both content
6providers. There is no discrimination in access quality between content providers when
’ = 0, that is ￿1 = ￿2. This is because when the ISP does not discriminate content
providers using the quality of network access (as management tra¢ c), the two CPs are
perceived as completely identical from the end-users point of view if the quality of contents
are the same, ￿1 = ￿2.
We assume that ’ <
t￿￿1(￿1￿￿2)
(1+￿2) . This assumption limits the asymmetry in non price
discrimination, and assumes away ￿market cornering￿ 2. When the ISP does not discrim-
inate CPs using access quality (￿1 = ￿2 = ￿), this assumption becomes ￿ < t
￿1￿￿2, and it
implies ￿1 > ￿2.
2.4 Surplus and welfare
We only consider full market coverage and we denote by ￿1 and ￿2 (= 1 ￿ ￿1) market
shares for both content providers. Explicitly, the marginal consumer￿ s is de￿ned by:
￿1(1 + ￿1) ￿ p1 ￿ tx = ￿2(1 + ￿2) ￿ p2 ￿ t(1 ￿ x)





p2 ￿ p1 + (￿1 ￿ ￿2) + (￿1￿1 ￿ ￿2￿2)
2t
and ￿2 = 1 ￿ ￿1 (1)
Under a discriminatory network regime, the pro￿t for the ISP is:
￿I = (p1 + s1 ￿ 2c)￿1 + (p2 + s2 ￿ 2c)￿2 + f1 + f2 (2)
and the pro￿t for CPi is given by:





i for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j (3)
The impact of di⁄erent pricing schemes can be evaluated by assessing consumers surplus,
pro￿ts of CPs and ISP, and social surplus. For regulatory purpose, it is possibly important
to consider not only social surplus as a welfare measure but also consumers surplus.
Moreover, a regulator with the objective to encourage a broad di⁄usion of contents should
take care of the bene￿t for ISP from di⁄erent pricing schemes and especially from network
neutrality.
2Market cornering happens, for example, when end-users can get access with a same price p1 = p2 = p,
and all end-users consume only from the content provider with the high quality.
7Industry pro￿t IP is equal to the sum of pro￿ts both for ISP and CPs, i.e. IP =





(￿1(1 + ￿1) ￿ p1 ￿ tx)dx +
Z 1
￿1
(￿2(1 + ￿2) ￿ p2 ￿ t(1 ￿ x))dx (4)










Remark that the last term in (4) assesses the e⁄ect produced by the ISP￿ s investment
in access quality into the disutility that consumers incur getting contents. The total
surplus is TS = IP + CS.
As mentioned above, we consider that under network neutrality, the access provider
cannot price discriminate neither end-users nor content providers. The following analysis
considers two cases according to the ISP can o⁄er content providers a pricing scheme
including a termination fee or not. We ￿rst consider that content providers pay a non
discriminatory ￿ at rate to get access from the ISP and secondly that content providers
pay a unit price for each consumer they attract with their contents. We also assume that
ISP does not discriminate CP￿ s using its investment for access quality i.e. ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿.
For each case, we analyze a sequential game where in the ￿rst stage the ISP sets access
prices for both side of the market (i.e. pi;si;fi) and, in the second stage content providers
choose their quality of contents (i.e. ￿i). We solve this game by backward induction.
3 The benchmark analysis: ￿ at rates
We consider ￿rst the network neutrality case. In this situation, end-users bear a ￿xed fee
to get access from the broadband provider and content providers pay a ￿xed fee to reach
end-users. Precisely, end-users pay an uniform fee i.e. p1 = p2 = p for network access and
content providers can get access to the network at a unique ￿ at rate f1 = f2 = f with
s1 = s2 = 0. That is, ISP subscriptions for end-users are ￿xed rate and CPs charges are
independent from the tra¢ c their contents generate.
From (1) and considering that end-users pay a ￿xed fee to get access from the ISP,





p2 ￿ p1 + ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿2)
2t
and ￿2 = 1 ￿ ￿1
Maximizing (3) with respect to ￿i and using (1), we can derive e⁄orts both content













































8t2! ￿ 0 as ! ￿ 1.
Indeed, because of CP2￿less e¢ ciency in quality investment its net returns are lower than
CP1 when uniform pricing applies. Using (5), (1), (3) and (2), the maximization problem
for the ISP is thus given by:
max
p;f




1 ) ￿ 0 and ￿(1 + ￿
N
1 ) ￿ p ￿ t￿1 ￿ 0
where the two constraints are needed to ensure that the market is covered and both




2a(1 + !) + 2t!(2￿ ￿ t)
4t!
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2 = 0 (7)
9Expression (6) shows that the ISP pro￿t is composed of two terms. The ￿rst (￿ ￿2c￿ t
2)
corresponds to the consumer￿ s surplus created by the investment in access quality. The
remaining term represents the consumer￿ s surplus indirectly created by the content quality
and captured by the ISP. In expressions (7) we see that CP1 earns a positive pro￿t alone.
This pro￿t represents the consumer￿ s surplus it obtains directly from the content quality
it has created. As CP2 is the least e¢ cient ￿rm, the ISP gets its entire surplus choosing
an appropriate ￿ at rate.









t(! + 1) ￿ (2! ￿ 1)a
!t2 (8)
Proposition 1 When ￿at rates apply, it exists a level of advertising pro￿tability (￿ a)
such that ISP￿ s incentives for investing in access quality is negative whenever advertising
returns are su¢ ciently high (a > ￿ a) and conversely.
This Proposition states that investment incentives of the ISP in access quality depends
on the level of the unit receipt of advertising for the CPs. One can easily see in expression
(8), that when a = 0 (i.e. advertising is free) the ISP￿ s incentives for investing in access
quality is unambiguously positive. On the other hand, when a takes very high values,
this incentives are unambiguously negative. In the appendix, we show that there exists
a level of advertising pro￿tability (i.e. the threshold ￿ a) under which the ISP￿ s incentive is
positive for all parameter values. Therefore, when advertising is more pro￿table (i.e. a is
above the threshold ￿ a) an incremental investment turns the ISP pro￿t down. In appendix,
we also show that the threshold ￿ a is a decreasing function of ￿:
The intuition is that there is a tradeo⁄ between advertising and access quality that
may occur at the equilibrium. When advertising is weakly pro￿table (i.e. low values of
a), the CPs provide low quality for contents and thus, consumers￿valuations for their
contents are low. In this case, to elicit consumers￿demand for contents, the ISP has
necessarily an incentive to increase its access quality. Hence, this investment allows the
ISP to post a high access fee and get more surplus from consumers than without any
additional investment. When advertising is very pro￿table (i.e. a above ￿ a), consumers
have high valuations for contents, reducing therefore the ISP incentives to increase its
access quality. This situation is more likely when the additional investment is realized
from an existing high access quality.
104 Termination fees
In the previous section, we have determined equilibrium outcomes and incentives to invest
in access quality of the ISP when content providers pay a ￿xed fee to reach end-users.
We now analyze how introducing termination fees could modify the surplus breakdown
between stakeholders and enhance (or deteriorate) incentives to invest in access quality
of the ISP.
Hence, we consider here that end-users pay an uniform fee p for network access and
content providers can get access to the network at an uniform unit price, namely a ter-
mination fee, i.e. s1 = s2 = s, so that fi = 0. We ￿rst give and analyze equilibrium
outcomes, and second we propose a comparison with the benchmark case.
4.1 Equilibrium
The main di⁄erence with the benchmark case is that with termination fee, quality contents
and thus CP market shares depends directly on pricing conditions on the CP side of the
platform, i.e. levels of termination fee denoted s. This creates additional e⁄ects on the
strategic decisions of ￿rms.
Now for a given termination fee, content qualities entail:
￿1 =
￿ (a ￿ s)
2t
and ￿2 =
￿ (a ￿ s)
2t!
(9)





















Straightforwardly one can show again that
￿1(￿1;￿2) ￿ ￿2(￿2;￿1) =
3(a ￿ s)
2 ￿
2 (! ￿ 1)
8t2!
￿ 0 as ! ￿ 1
Again, because of CP2￿less e¢ ciency in quality investment its net returns are lower than
CP1. With termination fee, the ISP pro￿t becomes ￿I = p+s￿2c and the maximization
problem for the ISP writes:
max
p;s ￿I s.t. ￿2(￿2;￿1) ￿ 0 and ￿ (1 + ￿1) ￿ p ￿ t￿1 ￿ 0
11De￿ning a value t =
￿2(1+!)
4! , the following Lemma gives termination fee equilibrium.
Lemma 1 When ISP can charge a termination fee, at the equilibrium they are given by:
(1) sT = a ￿
4t2!
￿
2 (2! ￿ 1)
< a and pT = ￿ +
3t
2(2! ￿ 1)
if t ￿ t
(2) sT = a and pT = ￿ ￿
t
2
if t > t
The intuition behind this result is that both equilibrium prices are related to degree of
substitutability between contents 1 or 2, i.e. parameter t. When contents are highly dif-
ferentiated (t > t), competition is relaxed between CPs so that consumers are su¢ ciently
captive and the ISP has no need to provide price incentives to promote CPs￿quality in-
vestments. Therefore it can set a high termination fee (a) which leads to a minimal level
of content￿ s quality (￿i = 0). Conversely, when contents are weakly di⁄erentiated (t ￿ t),
some investments in content￿ s quality are needed to increase consumer￿ s valuations and for
the ISP to extract more surplus. To do that it chooses a low termination fee (a￿ 4t2!
￿2(2!￿1))
which give some rents to the more e¢ cient CP.
From (9) and Lemma 1, the equilibrium quality contents depend on the degree of










2 = 0 otherwise.
With termination fee, again the least e¢ cient content provider (CP2) earns zero pro￿t
(￿T
2 = 0) and equilibrium pro￿ts for other ￿rms now write:
￿T




2 (2! ￿ 1)
; ￿T
1 =
6t2! (! ￿ 1)
￿
2 (2! ￿ 1)
2 if t ￿ t
￿T




i = 0 if t > t
As previously mentioned, we address now the issue of investment incentives of the ISP
by investigating the ISP￿ s marginal change in its pro￿t with respect to the level of access
quality parameter, ￿. In the line of the previous Lemma, the ISP￿ s incentive to invest











= 1 if t > t
(10)
From (10) one can see that ISP￿ s incentives to invest are always positive for all values
of the quality access. However, when contents are strong substitutes (i.e. t ￿ t), the
12ISP￿ s incentives is greater than when contents are weak substitutes. Remark that when
contents are strong substitutes, an increase in the access quality (￿) reduces the ISP￿ s
incentives to invest.
The following Proposition sum up the above discussion
Proposition 2 Allowing a termination fee always gives positive incentives for the ISP to
invest in access quality. Theses incentives are greater when contents are strong substitutes.
The termination fee has as main property to fully internalize the e⁄ects produced by
the unit receipt of advertising on qualities of contents. Contrarily to the benchmark case,
at the equilibrium, the tradeo⁄between advertising and access quality does not occur and
thus a marginal investment of the ISP is always pro￿table.
A related question that may be addressed is whether termination fees lead the ISP
to abuse of his market power on the platform. To answer this question, we show if the
ISP￿ s pro￿t maximizing termination fees can exceed the termination fees that a benevolent
planner could choose taking into account the state of competition on the platform. To
explore this issue, lets now consider the welfare maximization problem. Hence, mimicking
the ISP problem, the welfare maximizing scheme (s;p) solves
max
p;s TP s.t. ￿I ￿ 0 ; ￿2(￿2;￿1) ￿ 0 and ￿ (1 + ￿1) ￿ p ￿ t￿1 ￿ 0
From the solution of this problem (given in Appendix), one can derive the following
Proposition.
Proposition 3 Whenever ! ￿ ￿ ! and t ￿ ￿ t, the ISP pro￿t maximizing termination fee
never exceeds the welfare maximizing termination fee.
The result shows that when competition between CPs (similarly e¢ cient i.e. ! lower
than ￿ !) is su¢ ciently ￿erce (t low), optimal termination fees are never lower than the
ISP termination fees. In this situation, one can consider that the ISP does not abuse
of its market power on the content side of the platform ￿xing a too high termination
fee. This results from the fact, the ISP can capture rents on both sides of the platform
whereas the benevolent (utilitarist) regulator cannot achieve this trade-o⁄. As shown in
Lemma 1, when contents are strong substitutes (t < ￿ t), the ISP chooses a relatively low
termination fee to give incentives for CPs to invest in quality in order to retrieve rents on
the consumer￿ s side.
134.2 Flat rate vs. termination fee
This part is devoted to comparisons between ￿ at rate and termination fee regimes. In the
following we then study how introducing termination fees a⁄ect all equilibrium outcomes,
the surplus breakdown and ISP￿ s investment incentives in access quality.
4.2.1 Prices and content qualities
We ￿rst compare unit fees for consumers and content qualities in both ￿ at rate and
















Consider the case (ii) where contents are weak substitutes. In this situation, intro-
ducing a termination fee reduce both unit access price and content qualities compared to
￿ at rates. The intuition is that, as we have already seen, o⁄ering an access to a platform,
the ISP can capture rents on both sides. Using a termination fee instead of a ￿ at rate
alleviate the incentives for the ISP to post a high unit access price on consumer￿ s side
because he can get surplus directly from the CPs choosing a termination fee that fully
internalizes the e⁄ect of advertising (see Lemma 1). Consequently, content qualities turn
down. These results also happen when contents are strong substitutes (i.e. t ￿ e t < t)
because the termination fee is closely set to the fully internalizing level. For intermediate
values of the degree of substitutability between contents (i.e. e t < t < t), the equilibrium
termination fee does not fully internalize the e⁄ect of advertising. As a result, the ISP
must choose a higher unit access price than the ￿ at rate con￿guration. Remark that this
intermediate case does not appear when advertising is very pro￿table (a is high)3.
4.2.2 Pro￿ts and Surplus
We now compare pro￿ts and surplus in both ￿ at rate and termination fee. De￿ne another
value of t denoted t and given in the Appendix. We can state the following proposition.
3Indeed e t is higher than the bound
￿
2(1+!)





14Proposition 4 Assume that the degree of substitutability between contents is not too high
(t < t < t) and advertising is not so pro￿table (a < ^ a). Compared to ￿at rate, termination
fee (i) increase the ISP pro￿t ; (ii) do not decrease CPs pro￿ts; (iii) and yield a higher
consumer surplus.
These results show that a termination fee can be pro￿table both for ￿rms (ISP and
CPs) and consumers. In appendix we precisely show that these results occur when con-
tents are not too strong substitutes (t < t < t) and the unit receipt of advertising takes
low values. Hence, the ISP bene￿ts from using a termination fee instead of a ￿ at rate
(i) and this bene￿ts to content providers (ii). The intuition behind this result is closely
related to the one discussed in the previous Lemma. In Lemma 2, we show when contents
are not too strong substitutes that the unit access price for consumers is relatively high
but a termination fee push up the level of content qualities. Result (iii) shows that the
later e⁄ect dominate the former and the termination fee ￿nally increases the consumer
surplus.
4.2.3 Incentives to invest for the ISP
Now, we study how both price regimes, namely ￿ at rate and termination fee, on the
CPs side of the platform a⁄ect the ISP￿ s incentives to expand its network access quality.
Broadband operators usually claim that content providers act as free-riders since with a
￿ at rate they do not support the intensive use of network. In turn, this alleviate the ISP￿ s
investment incentives and ￿nally harms end-users. We give here some explanations about
these potential e⁄ects.
Comparing incentives to invest in both price regimes leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Introducing the termination fee increases incentives to invest for the ISP
(i) if advertising is su¢ ciently pro￿table (a ￿ a) or (ii) if contents are weakly di⁄erentiated
(t ￿ t).
As can be seen from Proposition 1, the ISP has no incentive to invest in access quality
when the unit receipt for advertising is high. On the other hand, Proposition 2 shows that
the termination fee gives incentives to invest for the ISP whatever the level of the unit
receipt for advertising. From these two results, we obtain directly (i) in Proposition 5.
15Furthermore, with the termination fee and when contents are strong substitutes (t ￿ t),
the ISP￿ s incentives to invest in access quality is the greater (see (10). Although the
ISP￿ s incentives are positive with the ￿ at rate when advertising is not so high, it does not
exceed incentives produce by the termination fee regime. This results because the tradeo⁄
between advertising and access quality, discussed following Proposition 1, does not occur
in the termination fee regime. Hence, the e⁄ect of advertising is fully internalize and ISP
can get entirely the return of its investment in access quality.
An implication of last Propositions is the following.
Corollary 1 Assume that the degree of substitutability between contents is not too high
(t < t < t) and advertising is not so pro￿table (a < ^ a). Then, the termination fee
increases both the ISP pro￿t and its incentives to invest, and bene￿t to consumers.
This corollary results directly from Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. Results highlight
that there are parameter values for which allowing to charge a termination fee provides
positive incentives for the ISP to marginally increase its access quality, and this bene￿ts
to consumers. It is particularly the case when both contents are of an intermediary degree
of substitutability and the unit receipt of advertising is low. The intuition derives directly
from that developed for last propositions.
5 Discussions
We focus brie￿ y in the following on two main discussions. The ￿rst consists to depart
from the linear price for termination fees considering that the ISP can now engage in price
discrimination. The second studies the possibility for CPs to control tra¢ c and we analyze
in this setting how termination fees may give CPs better incentives to management tra¢ c.
5.1 Termination fee discrimination
Allowing a monopolist, the ISP, to engage in price discrimination may be welfare improv-
ing compared to linear price. In the following, we ￿rst analyze whether the ISP has an
incentive to charge discriminating termination fees to content provider, and how it could
a⁄ect the consumer surplus.
16We assume that the ISP can use termination fees s1 and s2 to price discriminate
between content providers. We now consider that end-users pay an uniform fee p for
network access and each content provider can get access to the network at a unit price si
i.e. s1 and s2 can be now di⁄erent, so that fi = 0.
From (3), we obtain the equilibrium content qualities:
￿1 =
￿ (a ￿ s1)
2t
and ￿2 =
￿ (a ￿ s2)
2t!
(11)
Engaging in termination fee discrimination, ISP is able to capture more of the CPs￿
surplus. However, it remains the well known tradeo⁄: a high termination fee alleviates
ISP to charge high unit access price to consumers, and a lower termination fee induces
high content qualities increasing the consumers￿valuation and allowing ISP to charge a
higher access unit price. Discrimination could be more e¢ cient as it gives additional tool
for the ISP to solve this tradeo⁄.






















We now assume that s1 is ￿xed to a given level, denoted s1 = ￿ s, and we analyze how
the investment incentives of the ISP is maximized by controlling the termination fee s2.
The following Proposition shows how departing from uniform pricing (no termination fee
discrimination) the ISP￿ s investment incentives can move with price discrimination.
Proposition 6 Suppose that a given termination fee is set to s (here s1 = ￿ s). Allowing
price discrimination leads to a higher investment incentives of the ISP. When the CP1￿
termination fee is set at s, then there exists a termination fee s￿
2 < s that gives the best
incentive to invest for the ISP.
When termination fee discrimination is assumed, the ISP can improve his incentives
to invest choosing a lower termination fee for the less e¢ cient content provider (CP2).
This is a standard rent extraction result. One can remark that discrimination is stronger
(i.e. s ￿ s￿
2 is large) when contents are weak substitutes (t large) or when e¢ ciency gap
between CPs is more important (i.e. ! is larger over 1).
175.2 CPs incentive to manage tra¢ c
To investigate this issue, we need to introduce a new parameter, ￿i 2 [0;1], which repre-
sents the e⁄ort produces by CPs to control the tra¢ c that they pass through the ISP￿ s
network for delivering their contents to end-users. In the following, we come back to the
case of no price discrimination. Hence, the ISP charge a same termination fee for both
CPs.
The CPs pro￿ts write now:





i for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j (13)
Expression (13) shows how the parameter that represents the e⁄ort of tra¢ c management
of CPs a⁄ects their pro￿ts. Hence, a high value for ￿i means that CPi carefully manages
its tra¢ c: for each consumer, the CPi earns an unit receipt, a, from advertisers whereas
he pays (1 ￿ ￿i) unit of access to the ISP, which is less than unity. Therefore, increasing
￿i mitigates the impact of the termination fee for the CPi.
The question here is how terminations fee impacts on incentives of CPs to marginally
increase ￿i, and in turn what could be the best regime for consumers.
Considering a termination fee s, we deduce from (13) the equilibrium content qualities
as:
￿1 =
￿ (a ￿ s(1 ￿ ￿1))
2t
and ￿2 =
￿ (a ￿ s(1 ￿ ￿2))
2t!
(14)
Using (14), the CPs￿pro￿ts write:
￿1(￿1;￿2) =




2!s(1 ￿ ￿1) + 2￿










2s(1 ￿ ￿2) + 2￿




Proceeding as section 4, we derive, from the maximization problem of the ISP, out-
comes equilibrium. From the same reason than previously, as CP2 is the least e¢ cient
￿rm, the ISP can get its entire surplus with the termination fees.
The following Proposition states how termination fees a⁄ect the most e¢ cient CP￿ s
incentives to manage tra¢ c.
18Proposition 7 Suppose that both CPs produce the same e⁄ort to manage their tra¢ c
(￿1 = ￿2) and contents are strong substitutes (t < e t): (i) the most e¢ cient CP has
incentives to manage its tra¢ c in a better way; (ii) this incentive increases with the
network access quality (￿) o⁄ered by the ISP.
The economics behind Proposition 7 is as follows. Consumers value more for contents
that have a high quality. As content quality is an increasing function of ￿i, CP1 has then
an incentive to provide a better tra¢ c management. This, in turn, leads the ISP to choose
a relatively high termination fee (as shown in Appendix) and this hurts the CP1￿ s pro￿t.
Thus, for CP1 it appears a tradeo⁄ between managing tra¢ c (increasing ￿1) to attract
more consumers, and supporting a low termination fee (decreasing ￿1) to directly increase
its pro￿t. When contents are strong substitutes, the ISP chooses a low termination fee
to induce a higher content quality from CPs. In this case, CP1 can increase its e⁄ort
to manage tra¢ c without inducing a too high termination fee. Result (ii) shows that a
better access quality gives more incentives to content providers to control their tra¢ c.
This highlights complementarity between access quality and tra¢ c management from
CPs.
6 Concluding remarks
Are more sophisticated pricing schemes than the so-called "net neutrality " may increase
economic e¢ ciency on telecommunication platforms? How these pricing scheme are able to
enhance incentives to invest for Internet service providers? Broadband operators usually
claim that content providers act as free-riders since with a ￿ at rate they do not support
the intensive use of network. In turn, this alleviate the ISP￿ s investment incentives and
￿nally harms end-users. In this paper, we aimed to tackle these questions analyzing the
bene￿ts and pitfalls of non-discrimination/discrimination rules for network access using
a simple model of two-sided platform.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First departing from the "net neutrality"
status-quo where ￿ at rates are used, introducing termination fees can increase incentives
to invest for the ISP, more precisely when one-sided revenues from the platform for content
providers (i.e. advertising) are su¢ ciently high or when contents are weakly di⁄erentiated.
Moreover if the degree of substitutability between contents is not too high and advertising
19is pro￿table but not extremely, termination fees increase both the ISP pro￿t and bene￿t
to consumers. In some sense, our results support the idea that termination fees can be
an appropriate instrument to regulate a too intensive use of network by content providers
and therefore to alleviate the Internet service providers incentives to invest in network
extension.
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￿a2(1 ￿ 2!) + ￿ta(1 + !) + 2t2!
2t2!
? 0 i⁄ a 7 a
We analyze ￿a2(1 ￿ 2!) + ￿ta(1 + !) + 2t2! = 0.

















@￿ < 0 ; a ! 1 if ￿ ! 0+ and a =
(!+1)t
2!￿1 if ￿ ! 1. One can
also directly see that it exists b a = !+1
2!￿1t where 1
2t < b a < 2t, such that if a ￿ b a then
@￿￿
I
@￿ ￿ 1 for all ￿. However whenever a > b a then
@￿￿
I
@￿ < 1 and it exists a value of ￿ i.e.




@￿ < 0 , for ￿ > ^ ￿.
Lemma 1
As ￿I is linearly increasing in p, the last constraint is necessarily binding and using it in
￿I yields a linear function of s for which
@￿I
@s
7 0 , t 7
￿
2 (1 + !)
4!
We denote t =
￿2(1+!)
4! Therefore, as CP2 constraint has two zeros namely s00 = a and
s0 = a ￿ 4t2!
￿2(2!￿1) < a, these prices are chosen in turns according to




￿2￿ + 4￿! + 3t
2(2! ￿ 1)
if t > t then s
￿ = s
00 and p
￿ = ￿ ￿
t
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21￿ if t > t then ￿￿








The ISP investment incentive is:






3(2! ￿ 1) + 8t2!
￿
3 (2! ￿ 1)
> 0






Considering a concave shape in s for TP leads to verify the following parametric condition:
t ￿ tc =
￿2(!￿1)2
2!(!+1) . Here TP does not respond to p so the consumer￿ s and ISP constraints
are not necessarily binding. However, it always exist a value of p ￿ 0 such that both
constraints are not violated.
The unconstrained solution is de￿ned by sW = a￿
2t2! (!+1)
2t!(!+1)￿￿2(!￿1)2 < a and is admissible
while ￿W
2 (￿2;￿1) ￿ 0 (i.e. evaluated for s = sW). One can see that this is the case
whenever t ￿ tw =
￿2(4!2￿3!+4)
4! (!+1) with tw > tc. For situations where t < tw then the
welfare maximizing termination fee is de￿ned by Lemma 1. Moreover tw ￿ ￿ t if ! ￿ ￿ ! = 5
3
and in that case sW ￿ sT:
Proposition 4.
Let us denote ￿N
I = ￿￿





￿ If t ￿ t then ￿N













I = a ￿ 2c +
4￿





















2 (2! ￿ 1)
.
(i) We show that A = ￿4t2! + 2￿
2a! ￿ ￿
2a is a decreasing function of t and, takes
a positive value (￿
2a(2! ￿ 1)) when t = 0 and negative value when t = t. Hence, there
22exists a value of t denoted e t such that A is positive when t ￿ e t and negative when









2!t￿4t2! is always negative when a ￿ b a =
￿2(!+1)2





















2!t ￿ 4t2! is positive when t ￿ b t and negative otherwise. We can also show that
b t ￿ e t ￿ 0 if a ￿ b b a =
￿2(!+1)2
32!(2!￿1) where b b a < b a
Finally, we conclude that:
￿N
I < ￿T
I if a > b a
￿N
I > ￿T
I if a < b a and inffb t;e tg < t < supfb t;e tg; and ￿N
I < ￿T
I otherwise





We can show that ￿N
I ￿ ￿T





I > 0 otherwise. We
also show that
a(2!+1)
!+1 > t if a > b a
Finally: ￿T
I > ￿N
I if t <
a(2! + 1)
! + 1




























1 ? 0 i⁄ t ? e t. Remark that e t ? t i⁄ a ?
b a =
￿
2 (! + 1)
2
4! (2! ￿ 1)
. Then, ￿T
1 ￿ ￿N




￿ If t > t then ￿T
1 ￿ ￿N
1 = 0 ￿
3a2￿
2 (! ￿ 1)
8t2!


























￿ If t > t then CST ￿ CSN = ￿
￿
4a2 (! ￿ 1)
2
16t3!2 < 0
￿ Finally, CST > CSN i⁄ e t < t < t and a < ^ a.
Hence we can conclude that
(1) When t ￿ t then ￿N
I > ￿T
I if a < b a and t < t < t, where t = inffb t;e tg and
t = supfb t;e tg
When t > t then ￿T
I > ￿N
I if t <
a(2! + 1)
! + 1
and a > b a
(2) When t ￿ t then ￿T
1 > ￿N
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@￿ = ￿ 24t2!

















@￿ < 0, ￿(￿;0) > 0 and ￿(￿;a) > 0 then ￿(￿;a) > 0
for a ￿ ￿ a
































@￿ if a > a
Proposition 6
Using (2), (1) and (11) gives:





























￿(a ￿ s)(t + s ￿ s2)
2t2 +





= f(s2) where f0(s2) = ￿
￿(a ￿ s1)
2t2 +
￿(a ￿ t + s1 ￿ 2s2)
2t2!
and f00(s2) = ￿
2￿
2t2!
< 0. Suppose that s1 = ￿ s; ISP￿ s investment incentives reach a
maximum at s￿
2 given by f0(s￿
2) = 0: s￿
2 =
a ￿ t + ￿ s + !(￿ s ￿ a)
2
.
Finally, we show that ￿ s ￿ s￿
2 =
t + (a ￿ ￿ s)(! ￿ 1)
2
> 0 with ! > 1
Proposition 7
The proof is in the same line that of Lemma 1. After calculus we can show:



















2a(2! ￿ 1) ￿ 4t2!
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2￿
2(2! ￿ 1)3(1 ￿ ￿)












(2! ￿ 1)3(1 ￿ ￿)￿
3 ￿ 0










2a + 4t2 ￿ 4￿2t2￿
8(￿1 + ￿2)
2 t2 :










The equilibrium termination fee is now s =
a
1 ￿ ￿
which is increasing w.r.t. ￿.
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